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Abstract
Quantum Key Exchange (QKE, also known as Quantum Key Distribution or QKD) al-
lows communicating parties to securely establish cryptographic keys. It is a well-established
fact that all QKE protocols require that the parties have access to an authentic channel.
Without this authenticated link, QKE is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Over-
looking this fact results in exaggerated claims and/or false expectations about the potential
impact of QKE. In this paper we present a systematic comparison of QKE with traditional
key establishment protocols in realistic secure communication systems.
1 Introduction
It is impossible to obtain information about a physical system without disturbing it in a
random, uncontrollable way. This fundamental quantum-mechanical law guarantees the
security of QKE protocols by enabling the communicating parties to put an upper bound
on how much an eavesdropper can know about the key. QKE protocols such as BB84
[1] have been proved to be secure under the assumption that the known laws of quantum
physics hold [2]. Given this assumption, QKE is secure even in the presence of an adversary
with unlimited computational power. See [3] for an overview of QKE and other aspects
of quantum cryptology. Following common usage, we will call unconditionally secure any
protocol whose security does not depend on assumptions about the computational power
of a potential adversary.
Although QKE requires the use of (currently expensive) special purpose hardware
and/or networks, secure communications systems based on QKE appear to enjoy an ad-
vantage over most systems based on public key cryptography. For the latter would become
insecure if progress in algorithms for integer factorization or discrete logarithms were made,
and in particular if a quantum computer were built [4]. Because of this, unconditionally
secure QKE is often portrayed as being the ideal solution to the problem of distributing
cryptographic keys. We will now show that this view only tells part of the story and has
led to exaggerated claims and/or false expectations about the advantages of systems using
QKE (e.g., see [5]).
At least two other components are required in addition to the basic QKE protocol in
order to make a secure communications system.
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Firstly, QKE requires that the parties have access to an authentic channel (which need
neither be quantum nor secret). Any QKE protocol that does not fulfill this requirement
is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. For previous discussions of authentication in
QKE, see [6, 7]. The authentication mechanism used to provide the authentic channel may
or may not be unconditionally secure. We refer to the combination of authentication mech-
anism and QKE protocol as the key exchange sub-system. The key exchange sub-system
will only be unconditionally secure if the authentication mechanism and QKE protocol are.
Secondly, the keys that are exchanged in the QKE protocol are in turn used to protect
communication of data using an encryption algorithm. The encryption algorithm may
or may not be unconditionally secure. The overall QKE-based communications system
will only be unconditionally secure if the authentication mechanism, QKE protocol and
encryption algorithm all are.
It is common for vendors of QKE-based systems to offer the option of combining an
unconditionally secure key exchange sub-system with a conventional encryption algorithm
such as 3DES or AES [8, 9]. Of course, an overall communications system constructed in
this way cannot be unconditionally secure. We call such systems hybrid systems.
Typically, a QKE protocol forms only one component of a complete communications
system. Such a system can (in general) only be as secure as its weakest component. Thus,
in assessing the security offered by a system using QKE, one must examine the entire system
and not rely just on a claim of unconditional security for the QKE protocol component.
These issues appear to be well-known in the quantum cryptography community. Yet to
our knowledge there has been no systematic analysis, from the point of view of practical
information security, of how these issues impact on the applicability of QKE. Similarly,
little has been done to examine how QKE compares to more traditional approaches to
establishing secure communications in terms of practicality, cost, and security levels (both
those offered by the different approaches and those actually needed in applications).
The present paper intends to provide such an analysis. Our analysis is driven by an
examination of the need to provide an authentication channel in QKE systems. In Sections
2 and 3, we show that an unconditionally secure key exchange sub-system making use of
QKE requires the pre-establishment of a symmetric key between the communicating parties.
We then examine the practical consequences of this in Section 4.
In what follows, we make a division between systems using public-key authentication
and systems using pre-established symmetric keys for authentication. Furthermore, among
the latter systems, we will distinguish between hybrid systems and unconditionally secure
systems.
2 Systems using public key authentication
In such systems, public key cryptographic mechanisms, e.g., digital signatures, are used
to provide the authentic channel needed for QKE. The key exchange sub-system, and
hence the overall communications system, will be no more secure than the public key
authentication mechanism on which it is based. For example, if RSA digital signatures are
used for authentication, a system of this type would become insecure if quantum computers
became available. Hence such a system does not offer unconditional security. Moreover,
any system using QKE requires a quantum channel (e.g., an optical fiber) between the
communicating parties. Commercial QKE products can use existing telecom fiber optics
networks to provide the quantum channel [8, 9].
Nevertheless, a system of this type may still offer some security advantages over tradi-
tional (i.e. non QKE-based) approaches. In particular, in any successful attack on such a
system, the public key authentication mechanism would have to be broken before or during
the execution of the QKE protocol. This is in contrast to a system using only classical
information and traditional key-establishment techniques, where the messages exchanged
in order to establish a key can be stored by the adversary and analyzed at some point in
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the future, possibly using more advanced cryptanalytic techniques than are available at the
time of key establishment.
It follows from the above that, if the authentication mechanism is unbroken at the time
of key establishment, and if the one-time pad is used as the encryption algorithm, then
transmitted data remain secure indefinitely. Thus, in order to guarantee the long-term
security of communications, one would only need to be concerned about the capabilities of
attackers today rather than in the future. This could be an attractive solution for protecting
government secrets, for example. Similarly, if the authentication mechanism is unbroken at
the time of key establishment, and if an encryption algorithm such as AES is used, then
the data remain secure as long as that encryption algorithm remains secure. Such a system
would also be resilient to attacks in which an adversary was able to learn the private keys of
the communicating parties and then mounted a passive eavesdropping attack on subsequent
exchanges. Naturally, such a system would not resist active attacks subsequent to private
key compromise.
It should be mentioned that there exist proposals for quantum public key protocols,
where the quantum state of a string of qubits (quantum bits) is used as a key [10]. Storage,
distribution and manipulation of these quantum keys, however, require quantum informa-
tion processing capabilities beyond the reach of current technology. Using public quantum
keys for authentication is thus not an option now or in the foreseeable future.
3 Systems using symmetric key authentication
If the communicating parties already share a secret, symmetric key, then they can use that
key to establish the authentic channel needed to support QKE. In essence, both parties
attach cryptographic tags to their messages on that channel, the tags depending both on
the message transmitted and on the shared key. Such an authentication mechanism can
offer either conditional or unconditional security.
The classic approach to providing an unconditionally secure authentic channel is to
make use of a message authentication code (MAC) due to Wegman and Carter [11]. In this
approach, the parties use the Wegman-Carter MAC together with the pre-established key
to authenticate all their messages. The key can be much shorter than the messages being
authenticated. All currently existing authentication schemes which offer unconditional se-
curity are similar to the Wegman-Carter approach in that they depend on a pre-established
symmetric key.
A key exchange system using QKE and symmetric key authentication differs from a tra-
ditional key exchange system using public key cryptography in two main respects. Firstly,
as we have already mentioned, it requires a quantum channel between the communicating
parties. Secondly, it requires the initial establishment and management of secret keys be-
tween the communicating parties. This is certainly feasible, even on a large scale; a good
example is provided by GSM mobile communications systems. In a GSM system, a user’s
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) contains a 128 bit symmetric key which is shared with
the subscriber’s network service provider. This key is used in an authentication protocol,
one product of which is a fresh, symmetric data encryption key. In mid-2003, GSM sys-
tems were in operation in 205 countries, with more than 1 billion subscribers [12]. Such
symmetric hierarchical systems pre-date the advent of public key cryptography and have a
long and successful history of use in telecommunications and finance.
We now further subdivide our study of systems using pre-established symmetric keys
for authentication.
3.1 Hybrid systems
QKE can be used as a component in a hybrid system, where the secret bits resulting from
the QKE protocol are used as keying material in a symmetric encryption algorithm such
as 3DES or AES.
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Such a hybrid communications system using QKE can offer security advantages over
conventional alternatives. For example, it may provide unconditionally secure refresh of
cryptographic keys if an unconditionally secure authentication mechanism is used. However,
the security of the overall communications system will be limited by the security of the
symmetric encryption algorithm used. The overall security offered by this approach is
therefore only conditional.
3.2 Unconditionally secure systems
Here the communicating parties must establish an authentic channel with unconditional
security and use an unconditionally secure encryption algorithm. An unconditionally secure
encryption algorithm is provided only by the one-time pad. In order to achieve this level
of security for encryption, as many key bits as there are message bits must be established
by the QKE protocol. This may be a problem in some practical applications, as the key
bit rates of current QKE systems are relatively small. In a traditional one-time pad system
(not making use of QKE), the pre-established key must be at least as long as the data
to be communicated. A QKE system has an advantage here in that the pre-established
key can be relatively short, as it is used only to authenticate an initial run of the QKE
protocol, with part of the keying material exchanged in that run being used to authenticate
subsequent runs.
To summarize, by combining an unconditionally secure authentication scheme with a
QKE protocol, one can produce a key exchange sub-system which enjoys a level of security
that can be established unconditionally, assuming only the validity of the laws of quan-
tum physics. If the one-time pad is used as the encryption algorithm, then the overall
communications system can also be made unconditionally secure.
4 Discussion
It is likely that using QKE with public key authentication (and therefore not requiring
pre-establishment of a symmetric key) has security benefits when the long-term security of
data is of importance. There may also be some security advantages in using QKE in hybrid
systems as described above.
However, QKE loses much of its appeal in these settings, as the overall system secu-
rity is no longer guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics alone. To obtain an overall
communication system with unconditional security, an unconditionally secure key exchange
sub-system is required. From our analysis, it is evident that to obtain such a sub-system, a
pre-established secret key is required. We note that this requirement is seldom emphasized
by proponents of QKE. It is now also clear that QKE, when unconditionally secure, does
not solve the problem of key distribution. Rather, it exacerbates it, by making the pre-
establishment of symmetric keys a requirement. The often-made comparison between the
unconditional security of QKE and the conditional security offered by public key cryptog-
raphy overlooks this requirement of QKE. The establishment and subsequent management
of symmetric keys is a significant undertaking, and any comparison of QKE and public key
cryptography should take this fact into account.
The pre-established symmetric keys needed to provide authentication in an uncondi-
tionally secure QKE protocol could instead be used directly in a symmetric encryption
algorithm, or as the basis for a symmetric hierarchical system like that employed in GSM
and many other systems. Thus a complete evaluation of the purported benefits of QKE
should also compare the level of security offered by QKE to the level that can be achieved
using conventional symmetric techniques alone.
For a well-designed symmetric encryption algorithm, the best attack should require the
attacker to expend an amount of effort equivalent to that of an exhaustive key search in
order to break the algorithm, even if large amounts of plaintext and ciphertext are available
to the attacker. With the key lengths available today in algorithms like AES, an exhaustive
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key search is simply not a realistic attack. Furthermore, all known attacks against such
algorithms using quantum computers would be easily countered simply by doubling the key
length. Thus the only applications where using an unconditionally secure QKE protocol
appears justified are those for which the level of security offered by the best available
symmetric encryption algorithm is judged insufficient because of the risk that the algorithm
turns out not to be well-designed and there are advances made in the cryptanalysis of that
algorithm. In such applications, the QKE protocol should only be used with the one-time
pad for encryption, since any advance in cryptanalysis of symmetric algorithms may also
compromise the encryption algorithm used in a hybrid QKE system. We suggest that this
set of applications is in fact rather limited: we do not foresee many commercial uses where
the expense associated with such a degree of security would be warranted. Adding to this
the fact that conventional techniques have no requirements for special-purpose hardware
or dedicated networks, we believe that the traditional symmetric approach has much to
offer in comparison with unconditionally secure QKE. Whilst it is certainly worthwhile
to study the impact that the advent of quantum computing might have on conventional
cryptography, it is not true that large-scale quantum computing would bring about the
death of all conventional cryptographic approaches. Rather, it would serve to enhance the
value of long-established symmetric key management techniques.
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